From left: Sisters Ejegayehu, Genzebe, and Tirunesh Dibaba, all wearing Nike, and their cousin Derartu Tulu, in Adidas. Genzebe is expected to win gold in Rio, while the other three are already Olympic medalists. Photographed by Ron Haviv, Vogue, April 2016
(Vogue) — Ethiopia is a running-mad country—but it’s never seen anything like the Dibabas. Chloe Malle heads to Addis Ababa to meet the fastest family on the planet.
The only sound at the top of the Entoto Mountains is the thwack of a cowherd’s staff against the tree trunks as he leads his small herd of oxen home. I am doing my best to keep pace with Tirunesh Dibaba, 30, and her younger sister, Genzebe, 25, two wisplike Ethiopians with wide smiles and a fiercely close bond who may be the most formidable female track stars in the world. In the late-afternoon light high above central Addis Ababa, we zigzag between the majestic eucalyptus trees, paying heed to the uneven ground below and staying alert for the not-uncommon hyena sighting—no problem, the sisters assure me, as long as you clap loudly and throw a rock in the animal’s direction.
The Dibabas’ dominance in the field of distance running has captivated the track-and-field community. “There are a few running families, but not like the Dibabas,” says the Ethiopian track legend Haile Gebrselassie. These are the only siblings in recorded history to hold concurrent world records, and they are as charmingly unassuming in person as they are fearsome on the track. The sisters were raised three hours south of here, in a tukul, or round mud hut, without electricity—their parents subsistence farmers growing teff, barley, and wheat. Their mother, Gutu, credits her daughters’ success to a loving environment as well as a steady supply of milk from the family cows.
In fact there are seven Dibaba siblings, and all of them run. “What the Dibabas have is what Serena and Venus have, except there are more of them,” says Ato Boldon, NBC’s track analyst. “It’s not a stretch to say they are the world’s fastest family.” Tirunesh is the most decorated, with three Olympic gold medals; Genzebe is tipped to win her first in Rio. Their older sister, Ejegayehu, 34, is an Olympian, too, with a silver from Athens, and their cousin Derartu Tulu was the first black African woman to win an Olympic gold, in the 1992 games. “World records, Olympic medals, world championships—the Dibabas’ accomplishments are unprecedented in this sport,” says Boldon.
With Rio on the horizon, the focus is squarely on Tirunesh and Genzebe. This is Tirunesh’s comeback season after taking a year off to raise her now one-year-old son, Nathan; meanwhile, Genzebe had a record-breaking summer, decimating the competition in August’s world championships and winning IAAF’s Athlete of the Year award, a crowning glory in the sport. “Last year Genzebe was head and shoulders the best athlete in the world,” says race coordinator Matt Turnbull, who has worked with the Dibabas for almost a decade. “And with Tiru being out for so long now, people are excited to see what will happen. They’re a fiercely competitive family, and they really dictate the landscape.”
Framed pictures fill the Dibaba family home in Addis Ababa. Photographed by Ron Haviv, Vogue, April 2016
As modest (and petite) as the Dibabas are face to face, they are outsize celebrities on the chaotic, construction-clogged streets of Addis Ababa, where they travel by car to avoid being mobbed. Their arrival at their favorite restaurant, Yod Abyssinia, is greeted with hushed whispers (“Dee-ba-ba, Dee-ba-ba”) and reverential stares. The sisters duck under the restaurant’s theatrical thatched straw canopies and take a table against the wall, smiling patiently as a young man approaches and asks for a photo. Afterward Tirunesh takes out her iPhone 6 Plus—one of the few in the country, bought in Europe—her cerise-lacquered nails clacking against the screen as she swipes past the photo of chubby Nathan. For a night out, she’s neatly coordinated in skinny red jeans, a black blazer with white piping, and similarly duo-toned wedge sandals. She admits that she loves to shop when she is competing abroad, particularly on Newbury Street in Boston and at any Michael Kors store. Genzebe, who prefers Zara, compensates for her timidity with a sweet attentiveness. Her feet look tiny in black ballerina slippers with grosgrain bows over the toe box. She has replaced her Garmin GPS training watch with a gold one whose pavé diamond–ringed face takes up the entire width of her narrow wrist. Both women have braids in their thick hair and giggle while confirming that they share a hairdresser. Their respect and affection are obvious: Genzebe lives with Tirunesh, sharing a bedroom with her baby nephew, and when she becomes flustered following a question about her love life, Tirunesh protectively steers the conversation elsewhere. (For the record, Genzebe has a boyfriend, but he is not a runner, and she doesn’t want to talk about him.)
World records, Olympic medals, world championships—the Dibabas’ accomplishments are unprecedented in this sport
NBC’S ATO BOLDON
When Tirunesh’s husband, fellow track-and-field Olympic medalist Sileshi Sihine, appears, cool and handsome in tailored jeans and a shawl collar cardigan, another frisson of excitement ripples through the room. His and Tirunesh’s 2008 wedding ceremony was a nationally televised event, drawing half a million people to the city’s main square, where Olympic races are broadcast to huge crowds. The bride wore a lace-embroidered bustier top and a millefeuille tulle ball skirt; the groom, an iridescent gray pin-striped morning suit—all purchased on a trip to Milan. They don’t remember the name of the clothier, “but one of the best,” Sihine says authoritatively. “We know people.” Restaurant patrons lock their eyes on us as Sihine slips onto the low wooden stool next to his wife, squeezing her knee in greeting.
As the string notes of the krar fill the room and dancers take the stage to perform an Ethiopian eskista dance—a shoulder-snapping feat of timing and rhythm—I ask Tirunesh what music she likes to listen to. “Michael Jackson,” she answers with a sly smile. “He is my favorite,” the last word pronounced in three crisp syllables. At this Genzebe, breaking her shell of shyness, speaks up: “For me, Beyoncé.”
Their status—and status symbols—marks a stark contrast between the Dibabas and most others in this still highly impoverished country. Yet Ethiopia has the fastest-growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa, and Addis, with its ubiquitous eucalyptus-pole scaffolding and ragged blue construction tarps, is a riot of development. Like many of the nation’s successful track stars, the Dibabas and their in-laws have invested their fortunes back into their city; they are burgeoning real estate tycoons, owning multiple buildings in the capital—including the five-star Tirunesh Hotel, slated to open this fall on Bole Road, the Fifth Avenue of Addis.
Genzebe, in red, with Tirunesh and her husband, Sileshi Sihine—also an Olympic runner—and their son, Nathan. Photographed by Ron Haviv, Vogue, April 2016
Along with Kenya, Ethiopia is a powerhouse for turning out elite runners. According to David Epstein, author of The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance, much of the two countries lies in an altitude “sweet spot”—around 6,000 to 9,000 feet. “High enough to cause physiological changes but not so high that the air is too thin for hard training,” Epstein says. As NBC’s Boldon explains, “When the Dibabas come down to sea level—I’m not going to say it’s like Superman coming from Krypton, but it is a version of that.” There’s also the Ethiopian diet, with its reliance on the iron- and calcium-rich grain teff, and the typical Ethiopian body type, petite and narrow, which is ideal for the sport: Tirunesh is five feet three and 110 pounds; Genzebe is five feet five and 115 pounds. “They have a lot of fight in a very small lightweight frame,” says Boldon.
“If you compared them to a car, they would be a Ford Focus with a Ferrari engine.”
Genzebe’s Ferrari engine is in top gear at Addis’s only track stadium for an 8:00 a.m. workout. The sun is already high overhead, and she is warming up with her nineteen-year-old sister Anna. They move at a focused, steady clip, their legs in sync, so that from across the track they look like one person, Anna’s smaller frame blending into Genzebe’s. As they speed up, moving seamlessly into sprints on the straightaways, Genzebe’s strides are precise, a strict economy of energy and movement. The two finish the warm-up and plop down on the tartan track to shimmy out of their Nike leggings, casual in their cotton underwear as they pull on micro shorts, the pink swoosh on Genzebe’s matching her fuchsia Dri-Fit T-shirt.
The ensuing workout is a series of 20 400-meter sprints, timed by a national team coach, who jots down intervals in red ballpoint on his palm. Genzebe shaves off seconds with each rep, her muscles taut as bowstrings as she catapults herself across the finish line. Afterward it’s back to Tirunesh and Sihine’s impressive home, a two-story stuccoed mansion in one of Addis’s gated communities. Inside, framed photos of family members on victory podiums take pride of place, and a flat-screen TV plays yesterday’s Africa Cup soccer match, but Tirunesh explains that she doesn’t particularly like watching sports. She and her sisters prefer Amharic films. What American films does she like? “Anything with Angelina Jolie.” A large breakfast—traditional Ethiopian firfir and eggs—is followed by a nap, lunch, and then it’s off to the gym. They are on two workouts a day until Rio.
The air in Entoto, unlike the exhaust-choked streets of Addis, is crisp and clean—and also thin at 10,000 feet above sea level. When we gather for our late-afternoon run, the Dibabas’ cousin Tulu arrives on the mountaintop, now retired and looking more soccer mom than Olympian. The sisters cite her as their inspiration, and her lilting voice boomerangs through the trees as they jog together into a cattle clearing. Tulu, who won the New York City marathon in 2009 at the age of 37, is a gregarious and outgoing foil to the soft-spoken Dibabas. When asked whom she will cheer for if Tirunesh and Genzebe compete against each other in Rio in the 5,000 or 10,000, Tulu does not hesitate and squeezes Tirunesh’s shoulder. “She! She is my favorite!” then looks lovingly across at Genzebe: “I am sorry!” Genzebe remains diplomatic, saying only, “The strongest will win,” while Tirunesh explains that they likely won’t be in the same heat and then looks into the sun, which is dipping behind the crest of the mountain. “But we come to win, so. . . . ” She shrugs; the end of the sentence is unnecessary.
There’s an intimacy up here as we jog among the dappled eucalyptus, the Ethiopians slowing their pace to a relative shuffle while I wheeze from the effort and altitude. “We are always together,” says Tirunesh. “Maybe one day a week we aren’t together.” For all of their bashfulness, the sisters share a mischievous humor that they sometimes let loose on interlopers like myself. At the end of our run in Entoto, Tirunesh, jogging behind me, yells, “Hyena!” with authoritative urgency. I shriek, whipping my head around. When I look back at the girls, they are doubled over laughing, the only animal in sight a weary pack mule trudging slowly across the horizon.
(Addis Standard) — In his book, The Dictator’s Learning Curve, William J. Dobson argues that old-school dictators like Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao and Idi Amin ruled with unrestrained violence before the advent of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media networks known for instantaneous communication. Contemporary dictators cannot keep their evil deeds secret even when those deeds are committed in the remotest corners of the earth. Dobson observes: “If you order a violent crackdown — even on a Himalayan mountain pass — you now know it will likely be captured on an iPhone and broadcast around the world. The costs of tyranny have never been this high.” [1]
But some new dictators, while as brutal as the old-school despots, have learned how to stay in power without appearing to work against the global rising tide seeking democracy. In Dobson’s assessment:
Rather than forcibly arrest members of a human rights group, today’s most effective despots deploy tax collectors or health inspectors to shut down dissident groups. Laws are written broadly, then used like a scalpel to target the groups the government deems a threat… Rather than shutter all media, modern-day despots make exceptions for small outlets – usually newspapers – that allow for a limited public discussion. Today’s dictators pepper their speeches with references to liberty, justice, and the rule of law.
Ethiopia’s late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, though not featured in Dobson’s book, fits seamlessly the new dictatorship’s profile. Recognizing that naked intimidation was not suited to ruling in the era of “Third Wave Democracy” he peppered his speeches with the vocabulary of democracy, human rights and freedom. Noting his success in adjusting his rhetoric to new contexts, upon his death in August 2012, the Economist eulogized him as “The man who tried to make dictatorship acceptable in the world.”[2]
From the beginning of his rule, the late Meles recognized that winning the story is as important as winning the conflict in today’s world of instant communication and information dissemination. He skillfully constructed narratives that brought together sympathetic Western interests and Ethiopian groups who were wary of the new political dispensation of ethnic federalism. He created a narrative to delegitimize popular domestic political opponents. Whenever political imperative dictated, he readily switched to narratives that adjusted to changed circumstances.
Meles’s death in August 2012 not only removed the lynchpin on the intricate system he built but also deprived his successors of the mind that originated legitimizing narratives for the regime. The Oromo protests that broke out in last months of 2015 have shown that the regime in Ethiopia has lost its capacity to control the flow of information and to construct compelling narratives that meet the demand of the time. In this article, I highlight three political narratives that the late Meles constructed and deployed at different times, and how these narratives were used to legitimize the regime’s hold on power. I conclude my article by showing that despite these well established political narratives the ongoing Oromo protests have revealed that modern information technology has made it impossible for despots to rule an informed citizenry.
Ethiopia’s redeemer
In June 1991, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), followed by a few other rebel organizations, arrived in Addis Abeba and ensconced itself in power. After seventeen years of a military dictatorship (1974-91), the Ethiopian people were willing to give its new rulers a chance. Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four parties, was subsequently formed after the collapse of the socialist Derg.
In the first years of its rule EPRDF sought legitimacy by offering the following narrative that supported its right to rule:
The TPLF liberated Ethiopia not just from evil incarnate, Mengistu Hailemariam, but also from the centuries-old Amhara ruling class domination and cultural hegemony. The liberation will not be secure until the vestiges of the Amhara ruling class are removed from power and cultural dominance. The Amhara elite, who often present themselves as unionist Ethiopians, are beneficiaries of the old systems who are bent on turning back the clock of history. The EPRDF is the only redeemer of Ethiopia who can guard the gains of the liberation against chauvinists and the neftagna (rifle bearing) class.
While the TPLF is the only credible political organization on a mission to reform and rebuild Ethiopia, it is not the enemy of Amhara. The Amhara’s true mortal enemy is the “narrow nationalist” lurking in the new region named Oromiya. To be specific, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is the organization that massacred the Amhara in these places. In addition to its responsibility of saving the country from disintegration, the TPLF has the obligation to protect the Amhara from the narrow nationalist and administer justice against those who committed these crimes.
For this narrative to take hold, it was necessary to dislodge the Amhara elite’s political narrative that they were the custodians of a three thousand year old civilization. The late Meles, , who was at the forefront of the new leadership, often made pronouncements that many Amhara elite found irritating, such as: Ethiopia’s flag was a piece of cloth; Axum and Lalibela had nothing to do with the Oromo or other southern Ethiopians; and the notion that Eritrea was or is part of Ethiopia is without historical merit, and one that remains a fairy tale.
By attacking the symbols that Amhara elite cherished, the late Meles displaced the unionist, centrist, hegemonic narrative that had sustained them in power. Rather than offer an alternative, however, the Amhara elite opted for rehashing old issues. Perhaps believing that the ethnic groups in Ethiopia had assimilated into a single Ethiopian nation, they denied the very existence of an ethnic group called “Amhara.” They became vociferous opponents of Eritrea’s independence, accusing Meles of being as Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki’s lackey, and his party the TPLF Eritrea’s instrument in Ethiopia. The old narrative was doomed in the age of ethnic federalism.
For the Oromo elite, the narrative battle between the Amhara and Tigreans was a mere extension of a historical power struggle between the two Semitic nations in northern Ethiopia. Many interpreted the declaration of ethnic federalism as vindication of their own anti-neftegna narrative. Once the Amhara ruling class was eliminated, however, EPRDF, the coalition of four parties that was formed soon after 1991 with the late Meles still at the helm, turned its delegitimizing narrative against its second enemy, the Oromo elite, labeling them “narrow nationalists.” [3]
This narrative preceded the action of moving to destroy them:
The OLF is a secessionist organization committed to dismembering Ethiopia. It is a “narrow” and “extremist” organization that conducted the heinous massacre of defenseless Amhara at Bedano (Harar) and Arbagugu (Arsi). If the TPLF did not stop them, they would have kept on slaughtering the Amhara all over Oromiya. To prevent the OLF from repeating such atrocities, the TPLF has designed and successfully implemented a consistent operation against this Oromo anti-peace organization that is committed to destabilizing Ethiopia and derailing the country’s development efforts. And in this contest, the TPLF not only can win the war but it also can redefine war itself.
Like their Amhara counterparts, OLF leaders were unable to come to terms with this new strategy. They never presented a direct counter-narrative, but instead created appeals and arguments that emphasized the legitimacy of the right to self-determination, appealing to uninterested international audiences. Ethiopia’s new rulers successfully out-maneuvered these OLF leaders and created a rationale that justified imposing autocratic rule over the Oromo sector of Ethiopian society.
Overall, this narrative was designed to place the TPLF dominated EPRDF government as “Ethiopia’s redeemer” replacing Amhara and Oromo elite who were presented as “chauvinists” and “narrow nationalists” respectively. This kept the Oromo and Amhara elite in perpetual mistrust and conflict.
This narrative would have waned if it were not for the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000. The war stopped the substantial public criticism that the late Meles had endured since 1993 for facilitating Eritrea’s independence. Within the TPLF itself the way the war was conducted and ended launched a power struggle between two groups that came to be known as the Meles-Sebhat faction and the Tewelde-Siye faction. When the TPLF Central Committee debated and voted on the issue, the later prevailed over the former. The acrimony was shelved, however, in favor of a show of unity in the face of the ongoing war, which united both under the banner of defeating outside enemy – Eritrea.
Poverty eradicating Ethiopian patriot
But post Ethio-Eritrea war saw the ever powerful TPLF split into two factions. That gave the late Meles’s faction an absolute monopoly of power to conduct a massive purge against senior party officials who were accused of being “rotten Bonapartists” who exhibit anti-democratic tendencies, engage in corrupt practices and aspire to turn themselves into a ruling class. Some of them were subsequently charged and sentenced with grand theft and corruption. The purge did not stop within the TPLF but bruised the other parties in coalition with it. Notable purges were seen within the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO); and The Southern People’s Democratic Organization (SPDO) saw its head and president of the region, Abate Kisho, sacked from his position and subsequently charged with corruption. All this was done in the name of democratic centralism, party integrity and national survival.
Ethiopia’s war victory, which was quick and decisive, gave the late Meles and the party he dominated the chance to switch the narrative from bashing Ethiopia to becoming Ethiopia’s savior. He appropriated the narrative that was developed for the war against Eritrea.
Paulos Milkias, writing in 2001, describes this as follows:
Meles abhorred and still abhors Ethiopian nationalism that he, for some unknown reason, considers “chauvinistic.” But to win the war, he reversed gear. The Ethiopian flag that he earlier referred to as just “a piece of rug” all of a sudden became a highly revered symbol that soldiers and politicians passed from hand to hand going on their knees and bowing low. The national TV was suddenly filled with the pictures of victorious Ethiopian emperors from Tewodros and Yohannes to Menelik and Haile Selassie. Axum and Lalibela that he earlier said had no relevance to the people of the south were suddenly transformed into historical treasures that the entire Ethiopian populace regardless of their background and ethnicity had to die for. All this was to combat Eritrean nationalism. [4]
To strengthen his newfound Ethiopian patriotism, the late Meles and his party stalwarts took public steps such as refusing to sign the border agreement with Eritrea and belittling the sprinter group as anti-Ethiopia power mongers. When the Eritrean-Ethiopian Boundary Commission, (EEBC), ruling in 2003 awarded the disputed region to Eritrea, Ethiopia rejected it. For Meles, it was a political move designed to shore up his position within his party and in the country as an Ethiopian patriot.
At the same time, the Oromo capital was ordered out of Addis Abeba and relocated to Adama. When Oromo students protested the relocation, they were herded into prisons in the thousands, expelled from Addis Ababa University in their hundreds. The Macha-Tuulluma Association was closed. Oromo “narrow nationalists” were now dubbed “anti-unity” and “anti-democracy.” This move further endeared Meles’s led EPRDF regime to the Amhara as an Ethiopian patriot.
In the process, the Amhara Nation Democratic Movement (ANDM) became the most important junior partner in the EPRDF coalition. Its members came to dominate the government. Oromo elders discovered their subordinate position when they petitioned the then university president, Prof. Andreas Eshete, to reverse the decision to expel university students. He rebuffed their entreaties. Oromo elder’s appeal to four additional ANDM officials fell on deaf ears. The late prime minister never met them.
It was around that time that the ruling party discovered in economic appeals another opportunity for legitimacy. Designed to the system’s critics and appeal to international interests conditioned by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and China’s growing engagement of Africa, EPRDF, still led by the late Meles, launched a campaign portraying poverty as an existential threat to Ethiopia in a longwinded speech to party apparatchiks in 2002.
The issue of poverty in our country today isn’t a matter of choice…Today, poverty is a matter of survival. It has become unsustainable. Even if we choose to live in poverty, the level of deprivation is so high that …our only choice is to confront poverty. Demographic pressure itself is bringing pressure on the existing resources. We must know the enemy. Our ultimate enemy is poverty, an enemy that is not against just our quality of life but an enemy threatening our very existence as a people. If we are not free from poverty, foreign aid and dependency, our sovereignty itself will be in question. [5]
Meles’ colossal “war on poverty” thus was launched emphasizing his new brand of Ethiopian patriotism. After vanquishing his intraparty opponents and the Eritrean challenge, Meles and the ruling party he so easily maneuvered to stay in the top felt confident that it was even possible to win contested elections as an Ethiopian nationalist and anti-poverty crusader.
It was in that context that Ethiopia held the 2005 disputed national elections; the oppositions Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) – alias Kinijit in Amharic – and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) competed on a political agenda that emphasized “national unity”. The gambit proved disastrous for EPRDF. The contest by the opposition block of the election results led to post election brutal crackdown by the government against unarmed protestors, killing hundreds, and a reversal of election results.
Coalition partners that form the EPRDF – ANDM (Amhara), OPDM (Oromo) SEPDM (Southern region) – were all routed in their respective regions demonstrating that the nations and nationalities they purported to represent saw them invariably as puppets of the ever powerful and dominant TPLF. The unprecedented success of the opposition shocked the EPRDF to the core and awakened it to the grim reality that it could never win free and fair elections. The CUD triumph represents the revival of the detested “Amharas” and revealed the inadequacy of EPRDF’s so-called nationalist narrative and its war on poverty.
It was time for the third narrative – the narrative of power consolidation.
Champion of the “Developmental State”
Having seen his party crushed in the 2005 elections, the late Meles busied himself and his party to come up with a new narrative and saw, in China’s experience, the narrative of an economic growth model under a one party domination. This was a ready-made economic narrative to justify a heavy handed approach towards opponents. In this new narrative, the late Meles boldly asserted the ritual of elections would be conducted only to confirm the incumbent in office until Ethiopia became a middle income country. This was a rather sophisticated political narrative that goes like:
Ethiopia does not have comparative advantage in any productive field, not even in the cost of labor. The country’s agricultural exports cannot compete in international markets. In these circumstance, the private sector, which would be needed for sustained growth, would go for the readily available way of seeking to make money through rent of all kinds including natural resource and foreign aid rather than the rigorous task of benefiting from creating value for customers. Because the private sector will be rent-seeking not value creating, the state must guide the private sector to the possibility of shifting to value creation. The noninterventionist ‘night-watchman’ state, which allows only for the market to rule, is a second dead end. The ‘predatory state’ of Africa’s first post-colonial decades was one dead end. Ethiopia needs a capable state to lead development. To allow for technological capacity accumulation, which lies at the heart of development, Ethiopia needs an activist state that will allocate state rents in a productive manner. In other words, the government should also help by investing in education, research and physical infrastructure. Ethiopia needs a ‘developmental state’ that is obsessed with value creation and obsessed with making accelerated and broad-based growth a matter of national survival. To succeed in this, we need to establish the hegemony of developmental discourse.
Once we make value creation to be dominant, it will serve as the foundation of democracy. If we don’t succeed, the result isn’t just failure of democracy. If we don’t grow fast and share our growth, we will cease to exist as a nation. [6]
Needless to say, however, this developmental state proposition is fraught with contradictions. The first is whether the federal arrangement can survive the developmental state. The renowned scholar Christopher Clapham has pointed out that there is an inherent contradiction between developmental state, which requires central control, and federal arrangement, which requires devolution of power [7]. The kind of state-led growth program that the developmental state envisions requires centralized macroeconomic planning and management which in turn demands effective control of resources, particularly land. This cannot be implemented without reviving the very problems the structure of Ethiopia’s current federalism was designed to resolve.
Second, the benefits of growth must be shared broadly if economic growth were to serve as the basis of legitimacy [8]. Since the launching of the developmental state, the nuveau riche appear everywhere and seemingly out of the blue. The party itself owns business worth almost a quarter of the national economy – calculating the net worth of four mega businesses owned by the EPRDF coalition partners EFFORT, TIRET, DINSHO and WENDO Trading. This, of course, excludes the MIDROC conglomerate and many shadowy family businesses owned by or affiliated with oligarchs who officially serve as government officials. Ethiopia’s economic growth achieved under this “developmental state” model fails to be broadly shared.
Third, the announcement of double-digit economic growth is an insidious scheme that has left many Ethiopians confounded. If the government’s claims are true, many Ethiopians ask, why are people food-insecure? Why are employed people unable to keep up with price rises for basic consumer goods? Why are university graduates unable to find employment? In short, why is life miserable and prospects for improvement increasingly dim as the country’s growth rate increases?
The simplest explanation for the disconnect between rhetoric and reality is that the government plays a numbers game with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) approach to measuring development. Experts agree that the GDP doesn’t measure human welfare or the overall national economic health. I choose to focus on this specific issue because it relates to the Oromo protests that have rocked the country now for past four months. The Addis Abeba Integrated Master Plan, for example, highlights the contradictions in the ‘developmental state’ approach. In seeking control over land resources according to the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTPII), it proved that such a project cannot be implemented without provoking local resistance, requiring brute force from the state to quell it.
The Oromo protests of 2014 and 2015 were provoked by the arbitrariness of just such practices of land transfer. Around the country, the government offers prime farmland to foreign investors at less than market prices. In remoter areas, foreign investors are given a rent holiday or given land free of charge. The investor is allowed to export his harvest and the number is captured as GDP. The farmers who lost their farmland and their livelihood are hired as wage laborers if they are lucky; if not, they stand idly by and watch grain being trucked away from their former lands while they go hungry. GDP indeed grows but the people are hungry. This same government permits exporting hydropower while the country experiences daily blackouts. The kind of gobbledygook expose the developmental state is a political narrative designed to garner support for the regime rather than an economic policy meant to produce broadly shared benefits.
The undoing of the narrative of “Prosperity”
A quarter century after seizing power, the TPLF dominated EPRDF appears to have exhausted its options to construct narratives that delegitimize its opponents and legitimizes its rule. It is now revealed that the policies of the developmental state are not friendly to market forces. State control of land is shown to be antithetical to agricultural productivity as the looming famine demonstrates. The monopoly of party-controlled mega businesses and politically-affiliated private businesses have displaced individual ventures and given way to rampant corruption and uneven market structure. Because the realities on the ground have overtaken the rhetoric of the developmental state, the goal of creating a hegemonic developmental discourse has clearly run its course.
Prospects for constructing a new, workable legitimizing narrative are remote. The death of Meles Zenawi, the ever-creative fountainhead of new narratives has proved to be an irreplaceable loss. The developmental state narrative is exposed as a scheme for a political economy of banditry.
Led by Oromo protestors, Ethiopians have rejected a political economy that values the opulence of a shadowy oligarchy over ordinary human livelihood, and a development model that extinguishes human life in defense of private investments. No political narrative, however sophisticated, can persuade people that the deprivation they experience in daily life can be misconstrued as “prosperity.”
More importantly, modern media have made it impossible for the government to control flow of information and construct new narratives. The role of hundreds of individuals in reporting and spreading real-time information through Facebook and Twitter is a phenomenon that this government cannot combat effectively. Despite the government’s efforts to disrupt the flow of information, it cannot reverse the democratized field of the new media.
Oromo protesters are constructing a new Oromo narrative through sustained widespread resistance, new slogans and immense sacrifice. They have rejected totalitarian rule. They are demanding economic security, cultural regeneration, and self-rule in the Oromiya region. They have created an opening to look for common ground among all who reject the existing narrative to replace it with one that has the potential to shape the political scene in Ethiopia for the foreseeable future.
Ed’s Note:Ezekiel Gebissa is a Professor of History and African Studies at Kettering University in Flint, Michigan. He can be reached ategebissa@kettering.edu
End Notes: [1] William J. Dobson, The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy (Doubleday, 2012), p. 3. [2] The Economist, August 12, 2012 [3] International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontent,” Crisis Group Africa Report 153: 4 (September 2009), p. 4. [4] Paulos Milkias, “Ethiopia: The TPLF and Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor,” International Conference on African Development, Center for African Development Policy Research Archives Western Michigan University, August, 2001, p. 7. [5]“Meles Zenawi discusses poverty and the choices and means of defeating it with high Ethiopian government officials,” September 1, 2002.http://www.meleszenawi.com/the-late-ethiopian-prime-minister-meles-zenawi-explains-how-to-defeat-poverty-to-ethiopian-law-makers/ [6] Meles Zenawi, “State and markets: neoliberal limitations and the case for a developmental state.” In Good growth and governance in Africa: rethinking development strategies, (eds) A.Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein & J Stiglitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.140-169). [7] Christopher Clapham, “Federalism and the Developmental state”. Public Lecture Series on Perspectives on Diversity in Ethiopia, Centre for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University, September 23, 2013. [8] This was the concern of Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s developmental state, in the early 1990s. His famous Southern Tour was meant to mobilize support for his reform efforts against the opposition of the hardliners in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). His appeal to the reformers in the CCP who came to be his successors was that the party could not survive if the gains of the growth weren’t shared broadly.
Remember: Aaron Maasho has never reported positive about Oromo. This is not good for the reputation of Reuters. He does not even recognize an internationally accepted number of students killed only in the first two months of the unrest, that is 240. The unrest is now in its fifth month. The number of Oromo killed by the regime is far more than double of what Aaron reported below today.
By Aaron Maasho
MEDREK Rally on December 4, 2014 in Addis Ababa
ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) – An Ethiopian opposition group said on Friday that police had arrested more than 2,600 people in the last three weeks for taking part in land protests and that the government was thereby aiming to deter future protests.
Plans to requisition farmland in the Oromiya region surrounding the capital for development sparked the country’s worst unrest in over a decade, with rights groups and U.S.-based dissidents saying as many as 200 people may have been killed.
An opposition coalition said the arrests over protests in the four months up to February came despite government assurances of clemency.
Representatives of the government were not immediately available for comment.
Authorities scrapped the land scheme in January and pledged not to prosecute the demonstrators, while Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn issued an apology in parliament last month saying his administration would work to address grievances over governance.
Despite the pledges, the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (MEDREK) said 2,627 people have since been “illegally rounded up” and remain under custody.
“It is an act of reprisal,” MEDREK’s chairman Beyene Petros told Reuters.
“The whole purpose why they are increasing their witchhunt is to simply stop the public from planning or initiating any future public protest,” he added.
The coalition said in a statement that the arrests took place in 12 different areas of Oromiya, Ethiopia’s largest region by size and population.
The second-most populous nation in Africa with 90 million people, Ethiopia has long been one of the poorest countries in the world per capita, but has made strides toward industrialization, recording some of the continent’s strongest economic growth rates for a decade.
But reallocating land for new developments is a thorny issue in a country where the vast majority of the population still survives on small farms. The opposition says farmers have often been forced off land and poorly compensated.
OROMO FEDERALIST CONGRESS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP (OFC-ISG)
March 30,2016
Call for an End to the Crackdown: Stop Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia
March 30, 2016
On March 23, 2016, the Ethiopian government stopped Dr. Merera Gudina from leaving Bole airport of Addis Ababa and traveling to Washington D.C. Dr. Merera Gudina is chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the deputy chairman of the larger opposition coalition Medrek. The Oromo Federalist Congress International Support Group (OFC-ISG) is concerned by this travel ban. This travel ban is one among many violations of human rights.
In his interview on VOA Amharic radio program on March 24, 2016, Dr. Merera explained what happened: “At the airport they said to me, ‘Our system does not read your passport, maybe there is defect on your passport.’ I went to immigration, the office that issued the passport; although there is no problem with my passport, they failed to give me solution. I have been traveling with this passport for the last 30 years. This shows the government’s deliberate act to stop me from traveling.”
Despite the government’s claim to scrap the master plan, public admission to use of excessive force by their security forces, commitment to pay compensation to the families of the victims of the violence, and apologies for the lost lives; it has yet to follow through with any of its promises. The Oromia region is under martial law, and security forces are still carrying out arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, disappearances, and outright murder without any accountability with impunity. These acts demonstrate that the ruling party ignored the US State Department’s statement released on January 14, 2016 which urges that “all interested parties must be able to express their views freely, refrain from silencing dissent and to protect the constitutionally enshrined rights of all citizens, including the right to gather peacefully, to write, and to speak freely as voices of a diverse nation. We call for the release of those imprisoned for exercising their rights, such as political party leaders and journalists.”
We do not see any commitment to respect for human rights on the part of the Ethiopian government. The continued killings, ongoing crackdown against protesters, refusal to release political prisoners, and subjection of the entire Oromia region to military rule reveal that their apology and admission of fault are insubstantial. These empty promises may briefly appease certain concerned parties but do not address the demands and the root issue of the gross human rights violations. Moreover, after months of protest, there continues to be no meaningful consultation process that would create hope among the Oromo people for self-rule. For the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, fully 40 percent of the population, to be utterly disenfranchised with no path to participatory governance and no government body willing to respond to their demands that human rights, international law and the constitution of Ethiopia be followed is untenable.
As such we, OFC-ISG, call for:
the release of all imprisoned for exercising their rights, such as political party leaders and journalists.
the right of the people to gather peacefully, to write, and to speak freely.
the immediate withdrawal of the federal army from the Oromia regional state.
the Ethiopian government to respect the right to movement enshrined in Art. 32 of FDRE constitution for the prominent opposition figure Dr. Merera Gudina.
the Ethiopian government to take necessary steps to stop the violence, mass imprisonment, and killings of peaceful protestors.
Furthermore, we call on United States officials to put pressure on the Ethiopian government to respect the rights of its citizens enshrined in its constitution and realize constitutionalism in Ethiopia.
Oromo Federalist Congress International Support Group is a non-profit organization established in 2010 with a mission to bring an end to the brutal oppression, injustice and inequality in Ethiopia and advance human rights, rule of law, good governance, the protection of the environment and sustainable development in Ethiopia through advocacy, education, public forum and information.
Oromo Federalist Congress International Support Group (OFC-ISG)
March 30, 2016
Minneapolis, Minnesota
We Oromo people from all walks of life. We are witnessing the injustice in our own country and by #UNCHR as well. The criminal government of #Ethiopia have killed over 450 of our people just in last few months. Yet those who fled the injustice are facing rejection for the last 20 to 25 years. We demand the justice to serve our #Oromo People equally as the rest of refugees. UNHCREgypt is in position to solve our problems directly by addressing concerns to relevant government authorities and service providers.
(Afrizap) — Ethiopia has been dealing with protests since November 2015. Around that time, the government had made the controversial decision to expand the municipal borders of capital city Addis Ababa into farmland of the Oromia region. Oromia is the largest of the nine ethnic regional states in the country. Opposition leaders and activists believe that the expansion would be used for land grabs and would displace rural farmers. The government decided to retract the plan in January and claimed that they have the situation under control. But human rights groups are telling a different story: the Ethiopian government has supposedly been violently suppressing the peaceful protests, with as many as 200 casualties since November.
Government crackdown
The government retracted the “Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan” on January 12 and said that the initial chaos has calmed down. Human Rights Watch reported that while the protests have slowed down, the Ethiopian government has been violently suppressing the Oromia region. They interviewed 60 protesters and witnesses in the Oromia region from December to January. According to locals, policemen have carelessly fired into crowds, done mass roundups, killed during arrests, and used torture. There was a troubling occurrence on January 10th when security forces threw a grenade at students at Jimma University in western Oromia and stored dormitories. There was another incident on February 12 when forces fired on a bus coming from a wedding and killed four people.
“Flooding Oromia with federal security forces shows the authorities’ broad disregard for peaceful protest by students, farmers and other dissenters,” said Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The government needs to rein in the security forces, free anyone being held wrongfully, and hold accountable soldiers and police who used excessive force.”
A history of disagreement
Oromo politician Merera Gudina said that the issue goes beyond these incidents. He added that people in the Oromo community feel discriminated against and marginalized within the nation. Gudina feels like his people are left out of cultural activities and important national decisions. The Oromia region speaks a different language than the rest of the country; the region’s main language is the Oromo language, while the official language of Ethiopia is Amharic. And while the Ethiopian economy as a whole has been growing, many in Oromia are still poor. This is not the first time that people from the region clash with the central government. In 1973, Oromo nationalists created the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to fight for their rights against the Ethiopian Empire. It has been outlawed as a terrorist organization by the government.
“Until the Oromo’s get their proper place in this country I don’t think it [dissent] is going to go. The government wants to rule in the old way; people are resisting being ruled in the old way,” Gudina said.
As you might heard, since March 27, 2016, we Oromo refugees in Cairo, Egypt including women and children as well as healthy and sick have been protesting the slow processing and unfair rejection of refugee cases by UNHCR. We have occupied the UNHCR’s gate over the last week, however, the organization has never met our demands yet.
The saddest thing is, while our nation in Oromia are suffering under the brutal Ethiopian government, being discriminated as Oromo, almost a similar thing is happening to us in our asylum seeking country, Egypt. The UNHCR Cairo Branch Office has refused to give us a deserved attention particularly over the last 5 months, during which time the atrocities against the Oromos in Ethiopia are growing to the bitter end in connection with the ongoing popular Oromo protests across Oromia. Despite the reluctance of the UNHCR to our fair request, we have insisted on occupy the gate until we receive a deserved response from the organization.
Most of the Oromo refugees in Egypt are engaged in labour works with little daily and monthly basis wages to survive. During this essential protest for refugee rights, they all left their jobs behind with no income to feed themselves and their children.
Hence, we kindly request our Oromo compatriots in the diaspora to stand with us in two essential forms:
Urgent fundraising – Stand beside us with financial assistance to feed ourselves during the uncertain time we would spend in this occupy-UNHCR-gate protests.
Writing urgent appeal letters to concerned bodies – Oromo community associations, Oromo institutions like OSA and Oromo related Organizations in the diaspora, stand with us by writing urgent appeal letters to both the UNHCR-Egypt and the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva as well as to other concernd international bodies to influence them give us the deserved attention.
We will soon announce you our fundraising agents and their contact addresses around the world, so that you can simply contact them to help us.
The second Dire Tube award was hosted at Sheraton Addis last Saturday, March 26, 2016, and Dire Tube awarded artists and media personalities who were voted by the public. Here is the complete list of winners in their respective category.
2015 Best Music Video-Hachalu Hundesa Malanjira
2015 Best Music Video Director – Amensisa (director of Maalan jira)
2015 Best Hip-pop Artist Lij Mikael Fafi
2015 Best Tv Drama Meleket
2015 Best Comedians Abe ena Kebe
2015 Best Radio Programme EthiopicaLink
2015 Book of The Year Zubeyd Alex Abraham
2015 Best TV Talk Show Helina Azeze who is who
2015 Life Time Award Ali Bira (Oromo everlasting artist)
2015 Best Cultural Ambassador Samuel Yirga
OBS: Robe -> Goba -> Saanate (the coldest place in Oromia with exotic, but endangered fox)